NOTES
A CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA'S
APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
.ADJUDICATION
INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1978, Michael, an international businessman, and
Carole, an international model, began an adulterous affair. During the
affair, Carole conceived a child, and in May 1981, she gave birth to Victoria. A short time later, Carole informed Michael that she believed he
might be Victoria's father.
Five months after Victoria's birth, Carole's husband Gerald, a top
executive in a French oil company, left Carole and Victoria in California
and moved to New York City to pursue his business interests. Carole,
Victoria, and Michael lived together intermittently and held themselves
out as a family for several years. In the spring of 1984, however, Carole
left Michael to rejoin Gerald. Carole, Gerald, and Victoria settled together as a family in New York City. At this time, Michael filed a filiation action to establish his paternity and his right to visitation.
The story of Carole, Michael, Victoria, and Gerald is not from the
script of television's hottest daytime drama. Rather, it formed the basis
for litigation that reached the United States Supreme Court. In Michael
H. v. GeraldD., Ithe Supreme Court held that a California law that prevented Michael from establishing his paternity of Victoria did not violate
Michael's substantive due process rights. Justice Antonin Scalia authored a plurality opinion in which he argued that Michael did not have
a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his relationship with
2
Victoria.
In the opinion, Justice Scalia set forth his theory of the proper approach to fundamental rights adjudication: "In an attempt to limit and
guide interpretation of the [due process clause], we have insisted not
merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a
concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an inter1. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
2. Id. at 121-30 (plurality opinion).
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est traditionally protected by our society."'3 Justice Scalia's quest to elucidate the parameters of our fundamental rights does not end with the
identification of a tradition of protection. Because any general tradition
might arguably protect a multitude of asserted liberty interests, such a
method would allow for the proliferation of rights. To limit the proliferation, Justice Scalia utilizes a notion of levels of generality. He argues
that in selecting the level of generality at which to define a liberty interest, the Court should "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified."'4 This Note examines Justice Scalia's theory of fundamental
rights adjudication as expounded in Michael H.
The level of generality at which the Supreme Court defines liberty
interests is important because it, along with the Court's definition of tradition, wholly determines whether the due process clause protects an asserted liberty interest.5 Thus, Justice Scalia's determination that the
Court, in defining the scope of a liberty interest, must look to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protects or denies protection to
a claimed liberty interest, 6 along with his narrow definition of tradition,
led him to the conclusion that Michael's due process claim must fail. He
concluded that our society has traditionally denied paternity rights to
unwed fathers of children adulterously conceived. 7 Further, Justice
Scalia found that this tradition of the denial of rights was the most specific tradition relevant to Michael's relationship with Victoria.8 Under
Justice Scalia's approach, this supposed societal tradition defines the
class of constitutionally-protected parent-child relationships narrowly
and excludes those relationships in which the parent was an unwed fa3. Id. at 122.
4. Id. at 127 n.6.
5. Professor Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff have noted the determinative nature of selecting the level of generality at which to define a liberty interest. See Tribe & Doff, Levels of Generality
in the Definition ofRights, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1057, 1065-66 (1990). Tribe and Dorf aptly illustrate
this point using the Supreme Court's opinion and the dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986). See Tribe & Doff, supra, at 1065-67.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a liberty interest in private non-coercive
homosexual activity. Justice White, writing for the Court, framed the question as whether the Constitution protected "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at
191. The Court held that the Constitution did not protect a right to engage in homosexual sodomy,
noting that "[p]roscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots," id. at 192, and that "[slodomy
was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when
they ratified the Bill of Rights." Id. Dissenting from the Court's opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens argued that the case concerned "the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others." Id. at

206.
6. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
7. Id. at 124-26.
8. Id. at 127 n.6.
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ther of a child adulterously conceived. When the scope of substantive
due process protection is defined at this level of generality, Michael's relationship with Victoria is unprotected.
If, however, the Scalia plurality in Michael H. had defined the scope
of due process liberty as protecting established relationships between a
father and his child, then Michael's due process claim could have prevailed. Thus, it is important to ask whether Justice Scalia's narrow approach is constitutionally justified.
The issue of whether one level of generality is any more "correct" or
"legitimate" than any other level of generality also raises questions concerning the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's power. To legitimately
define the scope of our fundamental rights, the Court must adhere to a
valid theory of fundamental rights adjudication derived from the Constitution. 9 The Supreme Court itself recognizes that adherence to a theory
grounded in the Constitution and guided by the principle of judicial restraint plays an important role in legitimating the Court's decisions on
the scope of fundamental rights. 10
In Michael H., Justice Scalia justified his approach to fundamental
rights adjudication by asserting that his theory would limit judicial discretion." Yet, Justice Scalia's approach provides neither a theoretical
nor a practical restraint on the judiciary. Justice Scalia's interpretation
fails theoretically because the level of generality at which it defines the
scope of a protected liberty interest cannot be justified by reference to the
fourteenth amendment. In practical terms, the approach fails because it
exacerbates the problems inherent in any tradition-based theory of fundamental rights adjudication to the point that the approach becomes unworkable. Therefore, any claimed benefit of judicial restraint is illusory.
9. See Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3

(1971). Bork notes that the tension, inherent in a Madisonian system of democracy, between the
majority's right to govern in many areas and the minority's right to remain free from majority
interference in those areas properly left to individual freedom, is resolved through the Supreme
Court's power to define the spheres of majority and minority freedom. This resolution is legitimate
only if the Supreme Court acts under a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of majority and
minority freedom.
10. Justice white, in his opinion for the Court in Bowers, commented:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judgemade constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution ....
There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive
reach of [the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments], particularly if it
requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.
478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
11. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6.
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Part I of this Note details Justice Scalia's theory of fundamental
rights adjudication and explores the positions of both the plurality and
the dissenting opinions in MichaelH. Part II discusses the "neutral principles" theory, as well as criticisms of this theory in relation to Justice
Scalia's approach to fundamental rights adjudication. It concludes that
his approach does not provide the principled limitation on the judiciary
that he intends.
Finally, Part III illustrates how Justice Scalia's approach aggravates
the problems inherent in any theory of fundamental rights adjudication
grounded in tradition. These problems include the lack of a clear working definition of tradition, the uncertainty surrounding any effort to reconstruct the past, and the bias introduced by the application of our own
constructed notions of our predecessors' beliefs and customs to a current
case. Justice Scalia's approach heightens these problems, and as a result,
his theory becomes both unworkable and unsound. Finally, inherent in
any tradition-based theory of fundamental rights adjudication is the lack
of protection afforded to minorities 12 who have traditionally been unprotected by society. Part III argues that Justice Scalia's approach, by excluding protection for minorities, is conceptually at odds with one of the
major purposes of the fourteenth amendment and thus lacks constitutional justification.
I.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S

THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS

ADJUDICATION

In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the putative father, Michael H., whose
blood tests indicated a 98.07% probability that he was the biological father of his claimed daughter Victoria, brought a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity of Victoria and his right
to visitation. 13 Even though Michael established a parental relationship
with Victoria,1 4 the court granted summary judgment to Gerald D., who
was the husband of Victoria's natural mother, Carole, at the time of the
litigation and at the time of the child's conception.1 5 The court held that
no triable issues of fact existed as to the paternity of Victoria under Cali12. I use the term "minority" in a broad sense to encompass those individuals who act in an

area that is arguably protected by the fourteenth amendment, and yet who do so in a way that
distinguishes them from a majority of individuals who act in the same general area. Thus, Michael
H. was a minority because he fathered and nurtured a child, (thus acting in an area arguably protected by the fourteenth amendment as interpreted in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925)), whose mother was married to another man.
13. 491 U.S. at 114-15.
14. Id. at 114.
15. Id. at 115.
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fornia law. 16 Section 621 of the California Evidence Code provides that
the child of a woman, who was living with her husband at the time the
child was conceived, is conclusively presumed to be the child of the husband. 17 Under the statute, only the husband or the wife may rebut this
presumption. 8 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the superior
court's decision.19 However, no rationale garnered a majority.
In the plurality opinion, 20 Justice Scalia rejected Michael's assertion
that he had a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his relationship
with Victoria. Justice Scalia began his analysis with the proposition that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects only those
interests "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental. '21 Justice Scalia then argued that the presumption of legitimacy of a child was a fundamental principle of the
common law that promoted the peace and tranquility of the traditional
family unit.22 He found no countervailing tradition that protected the
23
relationship between an adulterous father and his illegitimate child.
Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that Michael did not have a protected
24
liberty interest in his relationship with his illegitimate daughter.
16. Id.
17. The California Evidence Code provides in relevant part that "the issue of a wife cohabiting
with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage." CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1989).
18. The husband may make a motion to rebut the presumption not later than two years after
the birth of the child. The mother may make a motion to rebut the presumption not later than two
years after the birth of the child if the putative biological father has filed an affidavit with the court
acknowledging paternity of the child. Id.
19. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's ruling, rejecting, among other
claims, Michael's substantive due process challenge to the California law. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the California Court of Appeal. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132.
20. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Scalia's opinion. Justice O'Connor, with whom
Justice Kennedy joined, concurred in all of Justice Scalia's opinion except footnote 6. Justice
O'Connor stated that "[tihis footnote sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be
somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (citations
omitted). Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgement of the Court. Justice Stevens noted that
"enduring 'family' relationships may develop in unconventional settings." Id. at 133. But after
stating that he "would not foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally protected relationship
between a natural father and his child might exist in a case like this," Justice Stevens found that
California law did not violate Michael's due process rights because, under California law, Michael
did have the opportunity "to convince a trial judge that Victoria's best interest would be served by
granting him visitation rights." Id.
21. Id. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
22. See id. at 124-25.
23. See id. at 125-27.
24. See id. at 127.
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Justice Scalia explicitly detailed the analytical process he used to
arrive at this conclusion in footnote 6. Here, he advocated that the
Court, when confronted with a claimed liberty interest, should "refer to
the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. ' 25 Under this approach, if no tradition exists that either protects or denies protection to
the rights of biological fathers of children adulterously conceived, the
Court would be guided by the traditions regarding the rights of natural
fathers in general. 2 6 Justice Scalia concluded that a specific tradition denying protection to fathers of children adulterously conceived did exist,27
and thus that such a father has no liberty interest in his relationship with
28
his child.
Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's opinion in Michael H.
and was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Specifically, Justice
Brennan took issue with Justice Scalia's analytical framework. Justice
Brennan argued that when deciding cases arising under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court had traditionally considered whether the limitation on liberty under consideration impermissibly
infringed upon one of the more generalized interests-such as freedom
from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing, and childrearing-that
"form the core of our definition of 'liberty.' ",29 Rather than ask, as
would Justice Scalia, whether society traditionally has protected the
rights of adulterous fathers, Justice Brennan would ask "whether the specific parent-child relationship under consideration is close enough to the
interests that we already have protected to be deemed an aspect of 'liberty' as well."' 30 Justice Brennan concluded that prior case law established that a father's biological link to his child, combined with a
substantial parent-child relationship, guaranteed the father a constitu25. Id. at 127 n.6.
26. See id. at 128 n.6. Justice Scalia seems to concede that if the Court had looked for guidance
to these broader traditions regarding the rights of natural fathers in general, Michael H.'s relation-

ship with his putative daughter would have been constitutionally protected. See infra note 91.
27. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 129.
28. Id at 129-30.
29. Id at 139.
30. Id. at 142. For example, the Court utilized this "proximity-to-an-established-interest-test"
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, the Court struck down a zoning
ordinance that prevented a grandmother from residing with her two grandchildren, who were first
cousins. Id at 499. East Cleveland tried to distinguish the case at hand from previous Supreme
Court cases protecting the freedom of personal choice in matters of the family. The city argued that
none of these precedents "give[ ] grandmothers any fundamental rights with respect to grandsons."

Id at 500. The Court rejected this argument, commenting that "unless we close our eyes to the
basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of
these precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Id. at 501.
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tional stake in the relationship with his child. 31 Thus, under Justice
Brennan's approach, Michael, who had shown a biological link with his
putative daughter, and who had established a parental relationship with
her, 32 would have a "liberty" interest in his relationship with his
33
daughter.

Justice White also dissented in Michael H. He argued that "the basic principal enunciated in the Court's unwed father cases is that an un-

wed father who has demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his
paternity by way of personal, financial, or custodial responsibilities has a
protected liberty interest in a relationship with his child." 34 Justice

White concluded that since Michael had demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his child, he had a constitutionally-protected interest in his

relationship with her. 35 Justice White did not focus upon adulterous fathers, but rather unwed fathers in general. Thus, the approach taken by
Justices White and Brennan, unlike that of Justice Scalia, did not look to
the most specific relevant tradition.
II. AN ILLEGITIMATE RESTRAINT
In Michael H., Justice Scalia expressed concern over the Court's
propensity for invalidating legislation on the basis of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, 36 and he implied that judicial activism
has undermined the legitimacy of the Court.37 Justice Scalia urged the

adoption of his approach to fundamental fights adjudication as a means

38
to avoid arbitrary decisionmaking by jurists.

31. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142-43 (1989) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). For a brief discussion of these cases, suggesting that Justice Brennan
was correct, see infra note 90. Justice Scalia would most likely agree with this narrow conclusion.
See infra note 91.
32. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
33. Id. at 143.
34. Id. at 157-58. For a discussion of the Court's unwed father cases, see infra note 90; this
discussion indicates that Justice White was correct. Justice Scalia seems to have agreed with this
conclusion. See infra note 91.
35. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 159-60.
36. See id. at 121.
37. See id. at 122 ("The Judiciary, including [the Supreme Court], is the most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution.") (quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 121 ("mT1he Due
Process Clause 'has at times been a treacherous field for this Court,' giving 'reason for concern lest
the only limits to... judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time
to be Members of this Court.' ") (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 502.).
38. Id. at 128 n.6.
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Justice Scalia's argument derives from "neutral principles" theory.
Neutral principles theorists advocate that citizens of our democracy are
best protected from the arbitrary exercise of judicial power by requiring
that judges consistently apply a principle across all cases unless the case
at hand can be meaningfully distinguished from the previous case in
which that principle was applied. Adherents of neutral principles theory
argue that "[a] principled decision.., is one that rests on reasons...
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved."'3 9 The adherents further advocate that "[t]he judge
must believe in the validity of the reasons given for the decision at least in
the sense that he is prepared to apply them to a later case which he cannot honestly distinguish." 4°
In footnote 6, Justice Scalia explicated a rule of law that he is prepared to apply across the spectrum of cases in which claims to fundamental rights are adjudicated. This rule, he believes, if adopted by the
Court as a whole, would guard against the arbitrary exercise of judicial
power. Justice Scalia stated:
Because such general traditions [as "family" or "parenthood"] provide
such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern society's views. The need, if arbitrary decisionmaking is to be
avoided, to adopt the most specific tradition as the point of referenceor at least to announce... some other criterion for selecting among
the innumerable relevant traditions that could be consulted-is well
enough exemplified by the fact that in the present case Justice Brennan's opinion and Justice O'Connor's opinion, which disapproves [my
approach], both appeal to tradition, but on the basis of the tradition
they select reach opposite results. Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best
when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text
41
nor by any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule of law at all.
Justice Scalia's approach fails as a limitation on arbitrary decisionmaking precisely because it is itself arbitrary. Justice Scalia selected his
preferred level of generality, the most specific relevant tradition, without
any basis grounded in the fourteenth amendment and without any justification at all beyond its utility as a harness on judicial activism. Although
reducing judicial discretion can be a positive goal, narrowing the scope of
protection that the fourteenth amendment affords to fundamental liberties, in the absence of any justification based on the text or history of the
39. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961).
40. L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES As LAWMAKERS 38 (1969).
41. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6.
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amendment, itself can be characterized as an exercise lacking in judicial
42
restraint.
In fact, some advocates of the neutral principles theory have warned
against just such an arbitrary derivation of principles. Robert Bork, one
such advocate, has criticized the Scalia-like approach to neutral principles theory. Bork argues that if judges are to avoid imposing their own
values upon society they must be neutral not only in the application of
principles but also in the definition and derivation of principles. 43 A
"neutral" judge not only must explain why a principle applies to one case
and not to another, but he also must explain why the principle is a proper
principle to be applied at all: "If [a "neutral" judge] may not choose
lawlessly between cases in applying principle X, he may certainly not
choose lawlessly in defining X or in choosing X .... To choose the
principle and define it is to decide the cases." 44
In his effort to avoid arbitrary decisionmaking, 45 Justice Scalia falls
into the very trap that Bork seeks to avoid. Justice Scalia chose the
"most narrow relevant tradition" as the guide for determining the scope
of a liberty interest, yet this choice is itself arbitrary. Justice Scalia made
no effort to explain why his principle was a proper principle of limitation
42. One could infer from his opinion in Michael H. that Justice Scalia believes that the most
specific relevant tradition, although not the inherently "correct" level of generality at which to define
a liberty interest, is nevertheless preferred because it is the most reproducible. For Justice Scalia, it
forms a limiting background principle for the adjudication of fundamental rights that simply places a
higher value on judicial restraint than on minority rights. Justice Scalia's approach to the doctrine
announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is quite similar. See Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17 ("[A]ny
rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a
background rule of law against which Congress can legislate. If that is the principle function to be
served, Chevron is unquestionably better than what preceded it."). Of course, under the Chevron
doctrine, Congress can reject an executive agency's interpretation of a statute. Minorities, unlike
Congress, lack the power to revise an interpretation adverse to their interests.
Part III (A) and III (B) of this Note argue that adoption of Justice Scalia's approach would not
lead to reproducible results. Thus, Justice Scalia's method cannot be presented as a balancing of
judicial restraint versus minority interests. Under Justice Scalia's approach, one gets neither.
43. Bork, supra note 9, at 7.
44. Id. at 8. Bork concludes that the "fundamental values" approach used by the Court in due
process analysis cannot be justified because where neither the Constitution's text nor history specify
the value to be preferred, "there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any
other." Id
Bork advocates two methods of deriving rights from the Constitution: "The first is to take from
the document rather specific values that text or history show the framers actually to have intended
and which are capable of being translated into principled rules." Id. at 17. Bork calls these "specified rights." "The second method derives rights from governmental processes established by the
Constitution." Id. These "derived rights" are possessed by the individual because "his enjoyment of
them will lead him to defend them in court and thereby preserve the governmental process from
legislative or executive deformation." Id
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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for the judiciary. Because Justice Scalia "chose lawlessly" in selecting
his principle, it presents no limitation upon the judiciary at all. As Justice Scalia himself noted, "a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by
46
any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule of law at all."
One might avoid the sting of Bork's criticism by denying the possibility of resorting to neutral principles. Paul Brest, in criticizing Robert
Bork's call for neutral derivation of adjudicative principles, makes just
such a claim as to the impossibility of determining neutral principles. 47
Brest argues that all adjudication requires jurists to choose among various levels of abstraction at which to articulate a principle. As a result,
any such choice inherently will not be neutral. 4 8 Thus, Brest concludes
that no constitutional adjudication can meet Judge Bork's demand that
49
jurists neutrally derive, define, and apply adjudicative principles.
Bork himself has endorsed judicial line-drawing in certain instances.
In defending his argument that only political speech deserves first
amendment protection, he argued the following:
Not too much should be made of the undeniable fact that there will be
hard cases. Any theory of the first amendment that does not accord
absolute protection for all verbal expression, which is to say any theory
worth discussing, will require that a spectrum be cut and the location
of that cut will always be, arguably, arbitrary. The question is whether
the general location of the cut is justified. The existence of close cases
is not a reason to refuse to draw a line and so deny majorities the
power to govern in areas where their power is legitimate.50
Borrowing from Bork's reasoning, 5 1 one can argue, given that the
fourteenth amendment does protect some liberty interests from government interference, that the existence of close cases should not limit the
judiciary to protecting only those interests that find specific protection in
the history or text of the fourteenth amendment5 2 or in the most narrow
46. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989). Justice Scalia did not say in his

opinion where if anywhere in the text of the Constitution one would find support for the notion that
the "most specific relevant tradition" properly defines the scope of a fundamental liberty interest.

Justice O'Connor notes in her concurrence that Justice Scalia's approach "sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area."
Id. at 132. In dissent, Justice Brennan commented more forcefully, "It is ironic that an approach so
utterly dependent on tradition is so indifferent to our precedents." Id. at 138. For an illustration of
how Justice Scalia's approach departs radically from the Court's traditional approach to fundamen-

tal rights adjudication, see also supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
47. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy. The Essential Contradictionsof Normative
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091-92 (1981).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Bork, supra note 9, at 28.
51. I assume that Bork would not endorse my twisting of his argument.
52. Bork suggests this limitation on fundamental interests. See Bork, supra note 9, at 17.
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relevant tradition. Rather, a judge who finds that a statute interferes in
the "general location" of a protected liberty interest should feel free to
strike down the law in order to prevent majorities from governing in areas where their power is not legitimate.
Indeed, if one needs to choose which side of the line to err on, then
one should choose to err on the side of the line that protects minorities
from the "tyranny of the majority." This approach would draw upon
one of the most precious traditions in the United States, namely, the pro53
tection of minority interests from encroachment by a hostile majority.
Even if the Court errs on the side of the minority in declaring that a
statutory restriction implicates a liberty interest, the statute may still
stand if the state can show that the statute's objective is "compelling"
and cannot be achieved in a less burdensome way.54 However, if the
Court errs on the side of the majority and declares that the statute does
not implicate a liberty interest, then the statute, if rational, will be held
valid whether or not a compelling state interest exists. 55 When the call is
a close one, the preferable choice is to force the state to justify its intrusion into an area that borders on a protected interest rather than to risk
allowing an intrusive statute to stand.
Thus, even if Brest is correct to argue that there are no neutrally
derived principles (and Justice Scalia cannot be faulted for drawing an
arbitrary line), Justice Scalia can still be criticized for drawing the arbitrary line that precludes protection for all asserted fundamental rights
that are not derived from the most narrow relevant tradition. If no constitutionally-justifiable means of pinpointing the proper level of generality at which to define a liberty interest exists, then the Court, when
drawing an arbitrary line, should select a level of generality that errs on
the side of those who need protection from majority tyranny, rather than
on the side of those in the majority who claim oppression from judicial
tyranny.
53. In FederalistNo. 10, James Madison wrote:
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government ... enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and
at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is then the great

object to which our inquiries are directed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 134-36 (M. Ferrand ed. 1966) (James Madison argued that
the best means of protecting minority interests was by dividing the community into so great a
number of interests as to make common interests unlikely and unity in pursuit of any common

interest difficult.).
54. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

155 (1973).
55. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,

304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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EXACERBATING THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN A TRADITIONBASED THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

Several problems are common to all theories of fundamental rights
adjudication that afford protection only to those liberties "so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'5 6 Such theories require jurists to agree upon a definition of tradition.57 For example, under Justice Scalia's approach, to identify the
most specific relevant tradition that either protects or denies protection
to an asserted liberty interest, one first must determine what does and
does not qualify as a relevant tradition. Furthermore, such theories depend upon the jurists ability to accurately discern the contours of our
people's deeply rooted traditions.5 8 Indeed, Justice Scalia's theory depends upon jurists discerning these contours with exacting specificity.

Finally, such theories often fail to protect those whom society has traditionally not protected. Although each of these problems is shared, to
some degree, by all tradition-based theories of fundamental rights adjudication, Justice Scalia's theory exacerbates these problems to such a great

degree that his approach becomes unworkable and conceptually
unsound.
A.

Defining Tradition

Justice Scalia accepts that the term "liberty" in the due process
59
clause protects more than just the freedom from physical restraint.
6°
Given this determination, Justice Scalia advocates the use of tradition,
and indeed the most specific relevant tradition, 61 as a guide to interpret
the term "liberty," "lest the only limits to ... judicial intervention be-

come the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of
[the] Court."'62
Tradition, however, is at best an illusory limitation so long as judges
are free to decide for themselves what does and does not qualify as a
56. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
57. Cf id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The plurality's approach forces the Court "to identify the point at which a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty and
the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer.").
58. Cf id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because reasonable people can disagree about the
content of particular traditions . . . the plurality has not found the objective boundary that it
seeks.").
59. See id at 121.
60. See id. at 122.
61. See id. at 127 n.6.
62. Id at 121 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
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tradition. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick 63 the Court cited ancient
proscriptions against sodomy as well as the fact that "until 1961 all 50
States outlawed sodomy, and [in 1986], 24 States and the District of Columbia continue[d] to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed
in private and between consenting adults" as evidence of a tradition disapproving of consensual homosexual sodomy. 64 However, one could argue that because twenty-three states repealed their prohibitions against
sodomy between 1961 and 1986,65 a new tradition respecting sexual autonomy and a right to engage in homosexual sodomy had been founded.
When defining "our traditions," it is unclear whether ancient customs should take precedence over modem trends, whether the "traditions" of France or of Africa should be considered as well as those of
England, or whether minority customs should be given any weight whatsoever. One might wonder if the answer a jurist provides to these questions will be influenced by the outcome he seeks to achieve. Dissenting in
Griswold v. Connecticut,66 Justice Hugo Black noted this problem:
"[T]he scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget
which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the
'[collective] conscience of our people.'" Justice Black concluded that
judges would be unable to avoid considering "their personal and private
notions" in determining what was a tradition. 67 If Justice Black was
right, then Justice Scalia's emphasis on tradition as the alpha and the
omega in defining the boundaries of due process provides a limitation on
the judiciary only to the extent that individual jurists are limited in their
creativity.
Unlike other tradition-based approaches to fundamental rights adjudication-which recognize tradition as helpful in defining a protected liberty interest, but do not use tradition as the sole determining factor 68Justice Scalia's approach makes the existence of a societal tradition,
which protects or denies protection to an asserted interest, the determining factor in defining the scope of a protected liberty interest. Thus, to
the extent that a jurist's definition of "tradition" depends upon his "personal and private notions," Justice Scalia's exclusive focus upon tradition
ensures that his approach is a wholly illusory limitation on the judiciary.
63. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
64. Id. at 193-94.
65. See Survey on the Law, Survey on the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 526-27 (1986).
66. 381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).

67. Id
68. See, eg., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality is misguided in ignoring the reasons for limiting the role of tradition in consti-

tutional interpretation).
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B. Determining the Most Narrow Relevant Tradition
Justice Scalia's "insistence that the asserted liberty interest be rooted
in history and tradition" 69 would be problematic even if there were an
agreed-upon definition of "tradition," because it requires that jurists become historians and sociologists. The problems faced by a jurist/historian/sociologist who scours the pages of history in search of our most
specific relevant traditions are greater than the problems faced by the
interpretivist jurist who struggles to divine the original intent of the Constitution's Framers. 70 Whereas the interpretivist jurist struggles to understand the handful of homogenous men who wrote the United States
Constitution, the jurist/historian/sociologist who attempts to faithfully
adjudicate a claimed liberty interest under Justice Scalia's theory must
struggle to understand and articulate the deeply rooted traditions of a
diverse, constantly changing society. Once the jurist/historian/sociologist uncovers the area of tradition that speaks to the claimed liberty interest, he must dig deeper to be certain that he has found the most specific
relevant tradition.
Justice Scalia's theory of fundamental rights adjudication is susceptible to the criticisms leveled at interpretivism. An obvious attack on any
theory that calls for an inquiry into the intent of the Framers is that the
intent of the Framers is unknowable or at least not directly accessible to
a judge. 71 Even more problematic, the deeply rooted traditions of this
nation are not directly accessible to a jurist, but instead must be constructed by him.
Critics of interpretivism argue that the theory is fundamentally
flawed because determinate continuities can not be identified from history, yet "[i]nterpretivism requires that judges today be able to trace historical continuities between the institutions the framers knew and those
that contemporary judges know."'72 This difficulty is compounded, critics argue, because interpretivists fail to appreciate that the meanings attached to beliefs and intentions derive from the societal context in which
those beliefs and intentions arose.7 3 Thus, one cannot understand the

meanings that our forebears attached to their beliefs and intentions without first understanding the society in which they lived. One cannot
69. Id at 123.
70. Interpretivists believe that judges "should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are
stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIMuSTr 1

(1980). Interpretivists rely upon the intent of the Constitution's Framers to guide them in their
search for these norms. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretlvism
and Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 782 (1983).
71. See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 793.
72. Id at 824-25.

73. See id. at 797.
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"grasp historical parts without embracing the historical whole." 74 In
short, interpretivism as a theory fails to appreciate that people are a
product of their environment.
A subset of interpretivism, the hermeneutic approach, 75 tries to remedy this shortcoming of interpretivism by attempting to embrace the historical whole. Adherents of this approach argue that, because beliefs
have meaning only in relation to the context in which they arose, to understand the intentions or traditions of those who lived in a previous age
one must first reconstruct that age. One "must enter the minds of his or
her subjects, see the world as they saw it, and understand it in their own
76
terms."
Critics argue that the hermeneutic approach also fails as a limitation
on the judiciary. When a jurist reconstructs the world of the past, he
creatively constructs it by using his own contemporary world view: "For
such creativity is the only way to bridge the gaps between that world and
ours. The past.., is in its essence indeterminate .... -77
These criticisms of interpretivism apply to any theory of fundamental rights adjudication grounded in tradition. The social mores of a people undoubtedly change over time and not only influence but are
influenced by the environment in which they exist; thus, today's jurists
cannot directly access the deeply rooted traditions of our nation. To understand these traditions, jurists must see the world as our forebears saw
it. Yet, those jurists who seek to reconstruct the past undoubtedly will be
biased by their own world view. Therefore, built into any theory of fundamental rights adjudication grounded in tradition is the uncertainty of
whether jurists have correctly interpreted our predecessor's beliefs and
customs. However, because broader principles are more easily applied
and more certainly ascertainable than are narrower principles, Justice
Scalia's approach exacerbates the uncertainty inherent in any traditionbased analysis by requiring that jurists utilize the most narrow relevant
tradition to define the scope of a liberty interest. To see this dilemma,
one need only look at the assumptions upon which Justice Scalia rested
his analysis in Michael H.
In Michael H., Justice Scalia cited the common law presumption of
legitimacy as support for the notion that "our traditions have protected
the marital family (Gerald, Carole, and the child they acknowledge to be
74. Id.
75. In the hermeneutic tradition, "historical knowledge is seen as 'the interpretive understanding of [the] meanings' that actors give their actions." Id. at 798 (quoting R. KEAT, THE POLITICS
OF SOCIAL THEORY: HABERMAS, FREUD, AND THE CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM 3 (1981)).
76. Tushnet, supra note 70, at 798.
77. Id. at 800.
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theirs) against the sort of claim Michael asserts." 78 Yet, the common law
upon which Justice Scalia's analysis relies developed at a time when
blood tests to establish paternity were unknown. 79 Thus, we do not
know what the 17th century English jurists who enforced the common
law would have done if confronted with a blood test showing a 98.07%
probability that Michael H. was the father of Victoria. The common law
presumption of legitimacy, therefore, did not necessarily reflect a preference for the marital family over the parental relationship. This presumption may have arisen merely because of a recognition that a child born
into an existing marriage is more often than not a child of the marriage.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the common law
presumption of legitimacy could be rebutted only if "a husband was incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant
period."80 Justice Scalia argued that this fact evidenced a narrow tradition that denied protection to the relationship between a putative father
and his claimed illegitimate child adulterously conceived. 8 1 However,
one can interpret this fact just as plausibly as evidence of a narrow relevant tradition that protected the relationship between a putative father
and his claimed illegitimate child adulterously conceived whenever there
was evidence that the husband of the marriage to whom the child was
born was almost certainly not the father of the child. How one views this
fact is likely to be influenced by the outcome one seeks to achieve.
One can confidently characterize the common law presumption of
legitimacy and the severe restrictions on rebuttal of the presumption as
evidence of a tradition respecting the family. Further, it is plausible to
argue, as did Justice Scalia, that the presumption and restrictions on rebuttal of the presumption reflect a tradition that prefers the marital family over the biological parent-child relationship. However, an equally
plausible argument can be made that these same facts reflect respect for
the biological parent-child relationship whenever the putative father can
prove his biological relationship. Thus, the broader tradition can be
stated with confidence, whereas the narrower "traditions" are uncertain.
Therefore, Justice Scalia's theory, which depends on the unknowable
most narrow relevant tradition, is unworkable.
C. ProtectingMinority Interests
Even if it were possible to define and identify the "most narrow relevant tradition" applicable to a claimed liberty interest, it would be a mis78.
79.
80.
81.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
See id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id at 124.
Id. at 124-25.
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take for the Court to adopt Justice Scalia's approach and use such a
tradition to define the scope of due process protection. The fourteenth
amendment was meant to protect minorities from oppression by the majority. s2 Justice Scalia's approach, because it focuses solely on whether a
claimed liberty interest finds support in the most narrow relevant tradi-

tion, is conceptually at odds with this goal. Under Justice Scalia's approach, it is the conventional morality of the majority that defines

tradition. Any analytical framework that entrusts the liberties of minorities solely to the conventional morality of the majority is constitutionally
unsatisfactory because conventional morality is often hostile to the inter-

ests of minorities.8 3 As Laurence Tribe has noted: "[A]ttempts to
ground constitutional rights of privacy or personhood in conventional

morality... are helpful but have inherently limited power. For we are
talking, necessarily, about rights of individuals or groups against the

larger community, and against the majority .... ",84 A close examination of Justice Scalia's approach demonstrates that his theory fails to protect minority rights against infringement by the larger community.
An important means of protecting minorities against the larger community is the requirement read into the fourteenth amendment that the

state show that the infringement of a fundamental liberty interest is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.8 5 Justice Scalia's use of
82. More specifically, the fourteenth amendment was intended to protect blacks from discrimination by the white majority. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Stevens) ("Unless the Constitution should restrain them those [Southern] States will all, I fear,
keep up this discrimination, and crush to death the hated freedmen."). The framers of the fourteenth amendment viewed it as a broader restatement of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in a form
immune from national legislative repeal. Eg., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., IstSess. 2462 (1866).
According to Representative Garfield:
The civil rights bill is now a part of the land. But every gentleman knows that it will cease
to be a part of the law whenever the sad moment arrives when that gentleman's [Rep.
Finck's] party comes into power. It is precisely for that reason that we propose to lift that
great and good law above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the plots and
machinations of any party, and fix it in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the
Constitution, where no storm of passion can shake it and no cloud can obscure it.
Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 had as its purpose to extend to black people the same civil rights as
white people enjoyed. Eg., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). Senator Trumbull
stated that:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the insurrectionary
States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all the States they have
discriminated against them. They deny them certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in
consequence of the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the
bill under consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into effect the
[thirteenth] amendment.
Id.
83. See supra note 53.
84. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3, at 1311 (2d ed. 1988).
85. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
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the most specific relevant tradition to define the scope of a protected liberty interest enables the state to infringe a previously established pro-

tected liberty interest without any showing by the state that the
infringement is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. The

plurality's reasoning in Michael H. illustrates this point.
Before Michael H., the Supreme Court examined the extent to
which a natural father's biological relationship with his illegitimate child
receives protection under the due process and equal protection clauses of
87
86
the Constitution in four cases: Stanley v. Illinois, Quilloin v. Walcott,

Caban v. Mohammed,

88

and Lehr v. Robertson. 89 One can convincingly

argue that Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr together hold that a father

who has demonstrated responsibility for his biological child has a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his relationship with that child. 90
Under Justice Scalia's approach, one can adopt this interpretation of
Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr, yet still find that notwithstanding the

fact that Michael has shown responsibility for his biological child, Victoria, he has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his relationship with her.91
86. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
87. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
88. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
89. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
90. The Supreme Court held in Stanley that an unwed father's "interest in retaining custody of
his children [was] cognizable and substantial," 405 U.S. at 652, and that the interest of any man "in
the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." I at 651 (emphasis added). In Quilloin, the Court held that a Georgia statute that allowed the adoption of an illegitimate child without the natural father's consent did
not violate the due process rights of the father who had "never exercised actual or legal custody over
his child, and thus [had] never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." 434 U.S. at 256. In Contrast, the Caban
Court held unconstitutional a statute similar to the one it had upheld in Quilloin. The Court held
that the statute as applied to an unwed father who had participated in the care and support of his
children was violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 441 U.S. at 391.
Finally, in Lehr, the Court held that neither the due process nor the equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment gave an unwed father the right to be heard before his child could be adopted
where the unwed father had never demonstrated any significant commitment to a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his child. 463 U.S. at 265-68. In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Stevens noted:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps
that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not
automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.
Id. at 262.
91. Indeed, in his plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia acknowledged
that in Lehr the Court had recognized that "Ithe significance of the biological connection [between
a putative father and his claimed illegitimate child] is that it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring." 491 U.S. 110, 128-29
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The Court's existing precedents are rendered irrelevant by Justice
Scalia's insistence that "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, [an] asserted right can be identified" 92 defines the scope of a liberty interest. The child in Michael H.,
unlike the children in Stanley, Quilloin, Caban and Lehr, was adulterously conceived. Justice Scalia argues that our society has a tradition
that denies paternity rights to adulterous fathers. 93 This tradition, Justice Scalia argues, is more specific than the tradition protecting the established relationship between a biological father and his child recognized in
the Stanley/Lehr line of cases. 94 Thus, the more specific tradition denying recognition to adulterous fathers defines the scope of Michael's liberty interest in his relationship with his child.
This is not to say that under Justice Scalia's approach the fact that
Michael's child was adulterously conceived acts as a limitation upon the
liberty interest that the Supreme Court previously recognized in the
Stanley/Lehr line of eases. Rather, under Justice Scalia's theory the fact
that Michael's child was adulterously conceived means that Michael has
no liberty interest in his relationship with her. To state the point another
way, Michael has absolutely no liberty interest upon which to place a
limitation.
The importance of this distinction lies in the degree of scrutiny that
the Court applies to laws that impinge upon a protected liberty interest.
A statute that impinges upon a fundamental right can withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing by the state that the burden
imposed is necessary to protect a compelling state interest. 95 The Court
will not find a burden to be necessary unless the legislature has drawn the
statute as narrowly as possible while still protecting the compelling interest.9 6 Conversely, a law that does not infringe upon a liberty interest will
withstand constitutional scrutiny if it is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 97 Under Justice Scalia's approach, because Michael has no
(quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262). Furthermore, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court in Lehr
"assumed that the Constitution might require some protection of that opportunity." Id. at 129
(citing Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262-65). Nonetheless, Justice Scalia argued, "Where, however, the child is
born into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State
to give categorical preference to the latter." Id.
92. Id. at 128 n.6.
93. Id. at 129 n.7.
94. Id. at 123-24.
95. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

155 (1973).
96. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.

97. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his relationship with his
daughter (despite having satisfied the prerequisites that the Supreme
Court previously enunciated for the enjoyment of such a liberty interest),
the Court need not ask whether the state's interest in protecting the marital union is compelling. Further, the Court avoids an inquiry into
whether the state can protect this interest in a narrower way than by
denying a putative father who has developed a relationship with his putative child any possibility of being declared the father of the child. Instead, the Court need only ask whether the state statute is rationally
related to protecting the marital union. This result occurs because Justice Scalia's approach combines a liberty interest enjoyed by the majority
(the right to preserve a developed relationship with a natural child) with
a characteristic that distinguishes the person asserting the liberty interest
from the majority (the father adulterously conceived the child) to arrive
at a conflated liberty interest (the right to preserve a relationship with an
adulterously conceived child).
The principal flaw in Justice Scalia's theory is not that his approach
defines "liberty" narrowly, but rather that, regardless of how one defines
liberty, his approach denies minorities the protected liberties enjoyed by
the majority. The best means of demonstrating the error in Justice
Scalia's reasoning is to hypothesize that the term "liberty" in the due
process clause only encompasses the freedom from physical restraint.
Still, Justice Scalia's approach would discriminate against minorities.
For example, a mental patient held against his will who asserts his
right to physical liberty will find that, under Justice Scalia's approach, he
is actually asserting the right to be physically free while mentally ill.
Under Justice Scalia's approach, no such interest will be recognized as
long as the state can show that it has traditionally infringed upon the
physical liberty right of the mentally ill.
In 1975, the Supreme Court adjudicated the claim of a mental patient who asserted that his right to physical liberty had been violated. In
O'Connorv. Donaldson,98 a former mental patient (who was confined to a
state hospital for nearly fifteen years) brought an action for damages
under section 198399 against the hospital superintendent who had refused
to release him. The former patient claimed that because he was dangerous to no one,lc ° the superintendent's refusal to release him "deprived
98. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).

99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (providing a civil remedy to plaintiffs who establish a violation of a
federal constitutional or statutory right by one acting under color of state law).
100. According to O'Connor, "[tihe testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction,
that [the former mental patient] had posed no danger to others during his long confinement, or
indeed at any point in his life." 422 U.S. at 568.
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him of his constitutional right to liberty."' 0 1 Despite the deeply rooted
American tradition of locking away the mentally ill in institutions, almshouses, and jails, 0 2 the Court did not frame the issue presented as
whether the superintendent had violated the patient's right to be free
while mentally ill. Rather, the Court stated "[a]s we view it, this case
raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man's constitutional right to liberty."' 0 3 The Court held
that the trial court had properly concluded that the superintendent had
1°4
violated the former mental patient's constitutional right to freedom.
The O'Connor Court, in recognizing the mental patient's right to
physical liberty, did not compound societal prejudices and the asserted
liberty interest. In contrast, Justice Scalia's approach makes societal
prejudices the controlling factor in defining the scope of liberty to be
enjoyed by minorities under the due process clause. This approach adversely affects all minorities--even blacks, the minority that the framers
of the fourteenth amendment most wanted to protect. 0 5 For example,
under his formulation, an interracial couple who in the 1960s asserted
the right to marry10 6 would have been denied that right because the majority had traditionally infringed the ability of interracial couples to
07
marry.1
In fact, however, when an interracial couple asserted a liberty interest in the right to marry, the Supreme Court rejected both the reasoning
and the result inherent in Justice Scalia's footnote 6 approach. In Loving
v. Virginia, a black woman and her white husband, both of whom had
been convicted of violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriage and
sentenced to one year injail, challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's
101. Id. at 565.

102. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 38-54, 114-31 (2d ed. 1949) (history of
care and treatment since the colonial period); D. ROTHMAN, THE DiscovERY OF THE ASYLUM 26595 (1971) (custodial qualities of post-1850 asylums).
103. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
104. Id. at 576-77. The Court remanded the case to enable the court of appeals to determine if
the trial court had rendered inadequate instructions with regard to the superintendent's claimed
reliance on state law. Id.
105. See supra note 82.
106. To be precise, under Justice Scala's theory, an interracial couple could not assert the right
to marry but, instead, must assert the right to enter into an interracial marriage.
107. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (The Court listed 16 states that currently
outlawed interracial marriages: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia. It further noted that during the previous 15 years, 14 states had repealed laws
outlawing interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.).
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anti-miscegenation statutes 10 8 Defending the statutes, the Commonwealth of Virginia relied heavily on the fact that at the time the states
ratified the fourteenth amendment most of the states had anti-miscegenation statutes. 10 9 The Court noted that fifteen states in addition to Vir-

ginia currently had anti-miscegenation statutes that prohibited and
punished marriage on the basis of racial classifications. 110 The Court further noted that as recently as 1952, thirty states had laws outlawing in-

terracial marriages. 11 Nevertheless, the Court held that Virginia's antimiscegenation statutes violated both the equal protection and due pro-

cess clauses of the fourteenth amendment.112 The Court held that the
statutes violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by

impinging upon "[tjhe freedom to marry" which "has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
13
happiness by free men."'

In Loving, the Court clearly did not "refer to the most specific level
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified." ' 14 If it had, the Court would have recognized that prohibitions against miscegenation are deeply "rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people"1 1 5 and would have denied pro-

tection to the asserted liberty interest in marrying a person of a different
race.
The Supreme Court in Loving recognized that "liberty" encom-

passes more than the freedom to do what the majority allows. Justice
Scalia does not accept this interpretation of liberty; instead, he would
deny recognition to an asserted liberty interest whenever "a societal tra108. Id Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter had been convicted of violating section 20-58 of the
Virginia Code which provided:
If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being
married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards
return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in
§ 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in
this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their
marriage.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1960) (repealed 1968).
Section 20-59 of the Virginia Code provided:
If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry
with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in
the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.
Id. at § 20-59 (1960) (repealed 1968).
109. Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 28-29, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
110. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id.
114. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
115. Id. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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dition of enacting laws den[les] the interest."' 1 6 Such an approach runs
counter to the purpose of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, who
intended to ensure states did not infringe upon minorities' enjoyment of
liberties that the majority had traditionally enjoyed." 7
CONCLUSION

In his effort to strike a blow against judicial activism, Justice Scalia
ignores the principle at the core of the fourteenth amendment-protection of minority interests. Indeed, far worse than tossing out the baby
with the bath water, Justice Scalia tosses out the baby but keeps the bath
water. The principal effect of Justice Scalia's approach to fundamental
rights adjudication is not to constrain the judiciary from declaring new
liberty interests, but rather to deny minorities the protection of established liberty interests.
The practical difficulties arising under Justice Scalia's formulation
ensure that his approach, if adopted by the Court, would serve as no
constraint on the judiciary. To give meaning to the term "tradition" and
to accurately discern the contours of our people's deeply rooted traditions are difficult, perhaps impossible, tasks. By relying exclusively on
the most narrow relevant tradition, Justice Scalia's approach fails as a
limitation in practice because it requires jurists to delineate the traditions
of our society with greater precision than they are capable.
Even if Justice Scalia's approach to fundamental rights adjudication
were a practical constraint on the judiciary, it would still be illegitimate
and ill-advised. Justice Scalia's attempt to constrain the judiciary
amounts to an arbitrary line that cuts off protection for fundamental liberty interests. According to Moore v. City of East Cleveland, "Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary
lines but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' "118 As
long as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment continues to
protect only those interests that our society has traditionally protected,
courts should not look to tradition as the sole means of defining the scope
of a liberty interest. Tradition should be merely the means for determining whether the values implicated by a claimed liberty interest have enjoyed protection in the past and thus whether a claimed liberty interest
merits further consideration. The Court must not "close [its] eyes to the
basic reasons why certain rights have been accorded shelter under the
116.
117.
118.
(Harlan,

Id. at 122 n.2.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
J., concurring)).
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Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause," but should "apply[ ] the
force and rationale of these precedents to the... choice involved in [a]
case."1 1 9
Edward Gary Spitko

119. Id at 501.

